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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ACCULOG, INC., a State of
Colorado corporation,
ROBERT PFISTER and KENTON
SHAW, co-partners doing
business under the firm
name and style of ACCULOG
FIELD SERVICES,

)
}
)

)
)
)
)

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 18133

)

)
)
}

vs.
KEITH PETERSON, d/b/a
PETERSON FORD,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants filed

su~t

in the Seventh Judicial

District Court, in and for Grand County, against the defendant to recover for damages to theii personal property which
damage they allege was caused by the negligence of the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants' statement of the disposition of this
matter in the lower court is accurate and adopted by
respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court, and the verdict found by the jury, and ask that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the verdict be remanded with instructions to the lower court
to enter a verdict in favor of the appellants on the question
of negligence and to enter a judgment for the stipulated
amount of damages.

Appellants also ask that the action be

remanded to the lower court for a trial on the issue of lost
prof its and on any other non-stipulated damages.
In the alternative, appellants request a new trial
on all issues not stipulated to previously by the parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts out of which this case arises are that
the appellants, while operating a business for the logging of
uranium and other ore materials, for various mineral companies, had a specially-equipped van destroyed, along with
its contents, by a fire on or about June 28, 1979.
The fire took place in a remote area south of Moab,
Utah at approximately 8:45 9:m·
Prior to the'day of the incident, the plaintiffs
had experienced difficulty with
on March 18, 1979.

the;~van,

since its purchase

The operators of the van had complained

that the van had a tendency to "cut out" and overheat.
After experiencing that difficulty for some period of time,
they brought the vehicle to the defendant's place of business, requesting repair.
The vehicle was brought to the defendant's garage on
the morning of June 28, 1979 and the repair and the evaluation
of the problem was handled by one of defendant's employees,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Mr. Allen Simon.

Mr. Simon testified that the vehicle was

suffering from three potential problems (T. 237).

He deter-

mined that there was foreign material in the fuel filter
which was precluding the flow of fuel to the carburetor.

He

testified that there had been a lot of complaints of vehicles
"cutting out" and the problem was created by a lot of "dirty
gas" around the Moab area.

Mr. Simon testified that he re-

placed the fuel filter, with its accompanying gasket, and
the connecting hose, and found no leaks to the system.
(T.

242.)
In addition, he found that the overheating could

have been possibly caused by a large obstruction, a tire,
mounted to the front of the vehicle, which inhibited the flow
of air and cooling of the engine.

In addition, he found that

the ignition system had been altered from that installed by
the factory and he was ·unable to .attempt any testing of the
ignition system because of.the modification.

(T. 238.)

Plaintiffs refused to allow
any additional work to
...
,

be done as it related to the emission and cooling systems
because of time commitments on the job.

(T. 243.)

Thereafter, the plaintiffs' employees picked up the
van and drove the van to the drilling site approximately 30
miles south of Moab.

Their trip to the logging site was un-

eventful and their movement of the vehicle between logging
holes was without incident.

As they began to return from

the site, their first indication of a problem as indicated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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by the driver, was "the strong smell of gasoline when we started
down the hill."

(T. 85.} They continued to descend down the

hill at a very slow speed due to the rocky surface, for up to
two minutes.

It was at this point that they heard a "popping"

sound and discovered the existence of a fire coming from
under the wheel wells.

The driver and passenger then attempted

to extinguish the flames in the engine by opening the hood
and throwing dirt and rocks onto the engine.

No attempt was

made to secure or find a fire extinguisher and what was
initially a fire around the carburetor resulted in the total
and complete destruction of the van and its contents. (T. 89.)
INVESTIGATION AND EVALUATION OF FIRE

various opinions were offered at the time of trial
to answer the question as to the cause of the fire.

Plain-

tiffs called an engineer by the name of Mr. Robert J. Cald•
well who testified that' he ex~mined the van several months
.

.

after the fire as it was parked in a salvage yard in Moab.
He indicated that the vehicle had

b~en

salvaged and much of

the van and equipment had been carried off.

He concluded,

following his examination, that the fire was fuel fed and
concluded that the fire had been caused by the repair work
done by Peterson Ford.

It was not until several months after

his examination and observations that he finally concluded
that the defendant had failed to install a gasket with the
fuel filter at the time of the repair.

However, at the time

of trial he indicated that his conclusions were based upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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probabilities and he could only assign his conclusion an 80
percent probability.

The remaining probabilities were that

the engine malfunctioned and that the fire was created or
caused by ignition of excessive fuel in the carburetor.

(T.

96-155).
Defendant called two expert witnesses who both
testified that under circumstances where there is dust and
debris or small particles in the fuel which have escaped the
filter, that there is a probability that the needles and
seats of the carburetor had malfunctioned and an excess of gas is allowed to build up in the carburetor.
This situation coupled with the bouncing and jostling of the
vehicle would cause the gasoline to "slosh" out onto the
manifold, thus causing ignition and a fire.

Both of defen-

dant's experts, one a mechanical engineer and another a
•
master mechanic, testified that more than likely the fuel
smelled by the driver and the passenger immediately prior to
the fire was created by the buildup*·pf gas in the carburetor
which subsequently ignited.

(T.269-280; T.288-315).

The question of the comparable negligence of the
plaintiffs and the defendant was given to the jury and the
jury returned a special verdict finding the plaintiffs 86
percent at fault for the injury and damage they sustained
and the defendant only 14 percent responsible for the same.
The court thereafter entered a judgment, no cause of action,
and the plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial which was
denied.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE WAS SUPPORTED BY
MORE THAN ADEQUATE EVIDENCE ON THE QUESTION OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.
Throughout plaintiffs' entire brief, they have
selected, erroneously, the basis for the jury's finding and
verdict in this case.

They have attempted to demonstrate to

this court that there is only one basis upon which the jury
was able or capable of finding the plaintiffs negligent.
There is nothing in the record which indicates that the jury
relied upon one of the acts of negligence of the plaintiffs,
more than any of the other acts.

Plaintiffs have also thus

erroneously characterized the trial tactic of the defendant
and in particular its closing argument in this case.

Plain-

tiffs specifically indicate that "the only facts argued by
•
defense counsel during ·closing argument to prove that plaintiffs were comparativeiy negligent were facts relating to
the plaintiffs' failure to have a

f~re

extinguisher in the

van and the plaintiffs' company policy that fire extinguishers
should be placed in each van for safety purposes."
Appellants' Brief.)

{P. 49

That statement, being fatally incorrect,

is a misstatement of the proceedings of the trial in this
case.

It should be recognized by plaintiffs' counsel that

defendant's closing argument was only a statement of the
facts as seen by counsel and was not necessarily representative of all facts upon which the jury made their findings.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On page 385 of the transcript in this matter, counsel's
argument as to plaintiffs smelling the gasoline prior to the
ignition or explosion is clear and proffered for the jury's
consideration.
In reviewing a court's ruling on a Motion for a
Directed Verdict and a subsequent Motion for a New Trial,
it has been this court's position:
In reviewing the trial court's rulings pertaining to motions for a directed verdict
or judgment N.O.V., this court reviews the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and to afford him the benefits of all inferences which the evidence
fairly supports.
If reasonable persons
could reach different conclusions on the
issue in controversy, a jury question
exists and the motion should be denied.
McLoud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (Ut. 1977).
Keeping this pronouncement in mind, let us consi•

der the position taken by the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs assert

that the only evidence:considered by the jury as to the
negligence of the plaintiffs had to.do with their failure to
~~

equip their van with a fire extinguisher.

Respondent takes

the position that singular act of negligence in and of itself
was sufficient for the jury's finding but certainly was not
the only basis for their finding.

Duringpthe cross-examin-

ation of Mr. Shaw, a part-owner and employee of the plaintiffs'
business, the circumstances immediately prior and during
the fire were examined.

Mr.

Shaw testified that after

completing the day's work they had started on their way home
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and driven a mile or two which took approximately ten minutes.
The reason the going was so slow was because of the very
rough and steep terrain which they were required to traverse.
{T. 84.)

Mr. Shaw was then asked,
"What is the first thing you noticed
coming down the hill that seemed out
of the ordinary?"

He responded,
"The strong smell of gasoline when we
started down the hill."
{Emphasis added)
{T. 85.)

Mr. Shaw was then asked:
Q. How long did you smell the gasoline
before the popping sound? I would like
you to think really hard about this.
How
long did you smell the gasoline before you
heard the popping sound?
A.

I would say about a minute or two. (Emphasis added)

Q.

A

A.

Yes.

minute or two?

Q. And you were _traveling down this steep
terrain, and going less_ than five miles an
hour in less than· a minute or two?
A.

Yes.

Q. Did you talk to Mr. Gates about this?
Did you say, "We've got to stop," or "We've
got to check this out and see what the problem is"?

A. I had it in my mind that I was going to
stop at the bottom of the hill and check it
out. But I don't remember saying anything
to Jim.
Q. But the smell was strong enough that it
created some concern to the extent that you
were going to stop at the bottom of the hill?
A.
(T.

Yes.

86, 87.)
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Mr. Shaw went on to testify that after a minute or
two elapsed from the time that he noticed the strong smell of
gasoline, he heard a "pop."

He characterizes the pop as

something similar to a tire blowing out.

He then saw flames

coming out from under the wheel well and jumped out of the
van.

When asked whether he turned the engine off, he

answered that he was not sure that he turned the engine off
but he was sure that he placed the vehicle in "park," and
put the emergency brake on.

(T. 86.)

Mr. Shaw and Mr.

Gates, employees and owners of the plaintiffs' vehicle,
subsequently attempted to put the fire out by opening the
hood and throwing dirt and rocks on the engine where the
flame was centered.

Their efforts were futile and eventually

they stood back and watched the van be consumed by the flames.
(T. 86-88.)
Clearly, the actions of. Mr. Shaw, the driver of the
vehicle, demonstrate a:factual situation which reasonable persons
could differ on their conclusions as... to his negligence
and causation of the actual fire.

For the sake of argument,

we will assume for a minute that the eventual fire was
created by the existence of fuel in the engine compartment,
either from the fuel filter or from the carburetor itself.
In this circumstance, it is clear that at the point Mr. Shaw
first noticed the existence of the "strong smell of gasoline"
he had up to two minutes to stop his vehicle and investigate
the source of the gasoline.

It is clear that the jury,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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given the total factual circumstance as indicated in the
record, coupled with the terrain involved and the prior
problems encountered by the plaintiffs, could and did find
that the plaintiffs themselves were negligent to a degree
greater than that of the defendant.

It is certainly reason-

able for a person to reach the conclusion that if Mr. Shaw had
responded to his concerns about the smell of gasoline prior
to the actual ignition or "popping" that there probably
would have been no fire, explosion or damage to the engine
or any other portion of the van.

Mr. Shaw himself admits

that he had it in his "mind" that he was going to "stop at
the bottom of the hill and check it out."

His delay of one

or two minutes under the circumstances was the actual and
proximate cause of the fire and explosion and eventual
destruction of the van, etc.
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs'
"

Motion for a Directed Veridct was proper and mandated.

In

addition, its denial of the plainti~fs' Motion for a New
Trial was proper and was not an abuse of discretion inasmuch
as the evidence clearly supported the finding of negligence
on the part of the plaintiffs.
In the plaintiffs' attempt to direct the court's
attention to one isolated argument, they have missed some of
the critical evidence offered at the time of trial, out of
the mouth of their own witness.
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There is additionally other evidence that was
offered at the time of trial from which the jury, acting as
reasonable persons, could conclude that the plaintiffs were
negligence.

It was the plaintiffs who did not allow a more

in-depth examination and evaluation of their vehicular problems on the day of the incident.

Mr. Allen Simon testified

that it was his finding that there were three possible problems with the vehicle that were creating the symptoms
experienced by Mr. Shaw and Mr. Gates.

He testified that he

undertook to correct one of them, the possible fuel filter
problem, but was precluded from doing further work on the
ignition system or the cooling system.

His testimony on the

matter is as follows:

Q. What happened, Mr. Simon, after you
finished.checking the filter and the fuel
line to see whether it leaked?
A.
I went to the service manager, Mr.
Charles Lovingood·,~ and explained to him
that the two~things that I thought were
wrong with the van. One being a possible
malfunction in the electronic ignition.
Also, an inability to test the ignition.
And also I believe the overheating problem
was probably caused by a very large spare
tire winch assembly on the extended bumper,
which was mounted directly in front of the
radiator.

Q. Now, tell us a little bit about this
ignition system, if you would.
First of
all, explain to us where it was located
on the engine, and as it related to the
carburetor system that we had been talking about.
A. Okay, the ignition coil is located
approximately right here, and the distriSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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butor right here.
They are both in front
of the carburetor.
The ignition control
box control module is what they call it,
is mounted up on the fire wall of the
vehicle over here on the van, as visualized in the relation there.
The factory wiring harness and ignition
control box had been removed, and an accessory unit had been put in or substituted,
which consisted of some unshielded versus
the stock factory shielded connection to
the coil.

Q. Can you explain what you mean by
"unshielded?"
A.
It was not insulated. They were just
baked, ah, light strips of copper wire and
a little thumb screw that hooked the wires
together.
It was not a slip-on wire that
is shielded against moisture and shortening,
type system. They were unshielded and were
just bare connections.

Q. Did you have any involvement with the
van after having this conversation with
Mr. Charles Lovingood?
A.
No, he came back to me and said, aThey
don't have the time to have any of these
things done. The vehicle has to be out in
the field, so they are going to pick it up.
So just put it out in the sidewalk."
(Emphasis added)

(T. 243.)
It is reasonable to conclude that the jury additionally found that the plaintiffs were negligent in their
refusal to have the vehicle completely and properly inspected
and evaluated on the day it was brought into the defendant's
facility.

If for instance, the jury concluded by the evi-

dence offered, which is clearly demonstrated in the testimony
offered by Mr.

Lovingood (T. 272-285), that the ignition
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system was related to the problems being experienced by the
plaintiffs, then their refusal to have that ignition system
tested or modified requires a finding of negligence.

Due to

the fact that no one is certain as to the cause of the fire,
[plaintiffs' own expert was willing to assign only 80 percent
to his opinion,] then the jury was allowed to form their own
opinion, based upon the evidence offered, as to how the fire
was actually created.
The record in the specific parts indicated above
demonstrates that there is more than sufficient evidence to
support the jury's finding in this matter, even without
considering the question of the lack of a fire extinguisher.
As this court has stated:
In reviewing a trial court's exercise of
discretion upon a motion for a new trial,
this Court examines the record to determine whether the evidence to support the
verdict was complet~ly lacking or was so
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly.unreasonable and unjust.
If
there be an evidentiary basis for the
jury's decision the deniai of the new trial
must be affirmed.
(Emphasis added).
McLoud v. Baum, supra, p. 1127.
As is indicated above, plaintiffs erroneously

.

choose for the jury which fact it relied upon in answering
the special verdict.

Plaintiffs' brief emphasizes, and

appropriately so, that plaintiffs themselves recognized a
standard of care in their industry but due to only time pressures, allowed themselves to breach that duty to themselves.
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Mr. Shaw, a part-owner of plaintiffs' business,
stated on cross-examination that it was standard procedure,
which is what the normal cautious person would do under like
circumstances, to have a fire extinguisher on the vehicle.
The pertinent part of that questioning went as follows:
Q. You had an interest in that van, and
the contents of the van, isn't that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q. And there was expensive equipment in the
van?

A.

Yes.

Q. And I think "sophisticated" has been the
word that has been used, but it was expensive equipment in the van, is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q. Have you ever made any attempt to get a
fire extinguisher for that van?

A. Well, it was-standard practice to• have
one in our vans. B-µt it was a new van. We
just hadn't got ~round to putting on in it
yet.
·
You hadn't put a
it yet?

Q.

A.

No.

fire_-~extinguisher

in

(T. 90.)

Q. Okay. But it's your testimony at this
time, that it's standard procedure to have
fire extinguishers on this type.of vehicle?
A.
Yes.

Q. And what would be the purpose for having a fire extinguisher on a van like this?
A. Just safety reasons.
Q. You heard Mr. Gates testify that he
felt like at one time you might have contained the fire, is that correct you
heard him testify as to that?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

Yes, I heard him.

Q.
Did you have the same thought at any
time?
A. Well, when I first saw it, I thought
we could put it out.
(T. 91.)

Q.
Is it your opinion that if you have
had a fire extinguisher, you would have
been able to put that fire out, initially?
A.

It's hard to say.

Q. But there is a pretty good chance that
you could have though.
A.

Yes I think we had a chance.

Q. And you would have put it out at that
point, the point that we are talking about,
you would have just had an engine fire, is
that correct?
A.

Yes.

Plaintiffs take the position that the failure to
have a fire extinguisher on the van could not be a factor in
•
apportioning negligence. Plainti~fs admit that they cannot
find any case law to support the argument but attempt to draw
an analogy between the case at bar and those controversies
existing over seatbelts and the negligence to be attributed
to the non-user.

The plaintiffs state in their brief on page

15 that "the seatbelt law is overwhelming to the effect that
a plaintiff's failure to use a provided seatbelt cannot be
used to bar his recovery."

However, the cases cited are those

cases which follow the contributory negligence rule and the
harsh remedy imposed by that law differs from the philosophy
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of comparative negligence.
With the adoption of comparative negligence in
Utah, Utah adopted a fault concept that apportions liability
for damages in proportion to the contribution of each tortfeasor causing the injury or damage.

Simply speaking, the

comparative negligence concept suggests that every person is
and should be responsible to another to the extent he caused
the injury or damage.

See Heft & Heft Comparative Negligence

Manual, §1.240.
When comparative negligence is applied, it abrogates contributory negligence, thus the result need not be
an all-or-nothing situation.

With the change was ingested

into the procedures a blending of contributory negligence
with other common law defenses into an aggregate of all the
negligence into the apportionment question.

In particular
•
was the abolition of the assumption.or risk defense.
With the aboiiti6n of assumption of
the risk, the doctrine of active and
passive negligence arose ~n the entire comparative negligence concept.
Active negligence is contributory
negligence which by its nature is the
basis of liability and could be a
bar to recovery.
Passive negligence
is the commission or omission of a
negligent act that could reduce
damage or injury but could never be
the basis of liability.
Heft & Heft, supra, §1.240 at 47.
Plaintiffs suggest that seatbelt cases most closely
parallel the instant matter.

This reasoning appears to be in
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error.

The closest cases for comparison have to do with the

Guest versus Host cases.
When the guest's exposure of himself
to a particular hazard is unreasonable,
or he fails to exercise ordinary care
for his own safety, such conduct is
negligence, and is subject to the
comparative negligence statute.
Obviously, a guest could be actively
negligent and cause a collision.
Examples might be where the guest
would interfere with the operation of
the vehicle; or where he might fail
to look under circumstances when he
was actively engaged in assisting the
operation of the vehicle such as in
the fog; or he might fail to warn under certain circumstances, or be actively negligent in some act or omission
that was a cause of the collision.
On the other hand, the guest might be
passively negligent by riding with a
host driver whose known habits and
lack of skill presented a hazard.
Another example would be where the
guest failed to wear a seatbelt.• Such
negligence would not be a cause of
the collision but might be a cause of
the injuries suffered by the guest from
such hazard.
,~

. • • As the doctrine developed, the
court consistently held that a person
riding in a vehicle driven by another
was under a duty to exercise such
care as the ordinary prudent person
would exercise under similar circum.stances to avoid injury to.himself.
A test of the guest's negligence was
whether under the circumstances he
acted with the care that a reasonable
prudent man would have exercised under
those circumstances. The rule under
comparative negligence in Wisconsin
is that a person riding in a vehicle
driven by another is under the duty
of exercising such care as an ordinary
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prudent person would exercise under
similar circumstances to avoid injury
to himself. Negligence of a guest is
his failure to exercise ordinary care
for his own safety.
Heft & Heft, supra, §1.240 at 47-48.
The concept of active and passive negligence was
explained by Mr. Chief Justice Hallows of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in a case where he said:
By the term "passive negligence" we include
conduct of a guest in failing to use ordinary care for his own safety in entering the
car or in riding with the host when knowing
of a hazard, whether the hazard be a condition of the car, the condition of the
driver, his lack of skill, or any other
hazard. Such negligence may contribute to
or be a cause of the guest's injury or may
not, depending on the facts of the accident
and the conduct of the host, but such
negligence is not a cause of the collision
nor the accident.
In such a case, the
collision or accident may be termed the
immediate cause or conduct through which
the negligence of the host or other driver,
or both caused the inju~ies to the guest.
If a cause of the accident is related to
the hazard iri respect to which the guest
was negligent, such passive negligence of
the guest is a contributing cause of his
injuries. Active negligence on the part
of a guest in failing to exercise ordinary
care for his own safety consists of his
acts or omissions which directly may be a
cause of the accident or collision, e.g.,
interference with the operation of the
car or its operator.
Thiesen v. Milwaukee Auto Ins., 118 N.W.2d 140 (Wis., 1962).
Some jurisdictions have not liked the passive and
active label used in the process of comparing fault, but have
followed the same basic reasoning as enunciated above.
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A

recent holding of the Alaska Supreme Court closely paralells
the reasoning being espoused by respondent in the instant matter.

In the case of State of Alaska v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775

(Alaska, 1977), the Alaska Supreme Court held that in comparative negligence cases what is being compared is negligent
conduct, fault or culpability not causation, either physical
or legal.

572 P.2d at 782.
The Kaatz case involved a suit against the State of

Alaska for the death of the plaintiff's husband who was killed
while riding on a frontend loader which overturned on an icy
highway.

The plaintiff alleged that the death resulted from

the defendant, State's, failure to properly maintain and sand
the highway.

The State alleged that the decedent's own

negligence contributed to his death, "Because he knew the
hazardous condition of the highway and the extremely unstable
operating characteristics of the machine on which he was riding."
The Court, iri summarizing the facts as demonstrated
at the time of trial, indicated that- .... the decedent

Kaatz, had

driven the section of the highway in question before riding
as a passenger on the loader.

The trial court found that

Kaatz was familiar with the characteristics of the loader
and knew the conditions of the road, and the company policy
forbidding persons to ride as passengers on the loader.
The trial Court, by jury verdict, returned a finding
that the State was 85 percent negligent, and Kaatz, 15 percent
negligent, even though he was not the operator of the vehicle,
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but merely a passenger at the time of the incident.

The

state, however, contended that the decedeant, Kaatz should
have been found at least 50 percent responsible for his
injuries and damages.

The State's argument was made in the

context of active and passive negligence, and the Alaska
Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
'The State asserts that Kaatz was actively
negligent and the State passively negligent,
and therefore as a matter of law, the
greater percent of negligence must be assigned
to Kaatz. The State takes the active/passive
concept from factual context different from
this one.
It is not clear that the State's
negligence should be classified as passive,
and Kaatz as active.
In any event, we see
little to be gained in importing the active/
passive distinction in the comparison of
negligence. one of the virtues of comparative
negligence is its greater flexibility.
See Schwartz, supra, §21-2 at 340.
Introducing
various standards and concepts from other
areas of tort law, and creating from them
rigid rules to use in comparing negli~ence
would destroy. much of that flexibility • • •
~

• • • We cannot offer specific quidelines on
how to compare negligence. Every case must
turn on its own facts.
The trier of fact,
whether judge or jury mus~ apply its ordinary
human experience to the facts revealed by the
evidence.·
As the Supreme Court of Alaska so clearly stated,
even though it found the concepts of active and passive inappropriate, the comparison to be made under comparative
negligence statutes is conduct, fault, or culpability not
causation, either physical or legal.
Fisheries Inc., vs.

see also, Pann Alaska

Marine Construction and Design Co., 402

F.2d 1187 (W.D. Washington, 1975);

v.

Schwartz, Comparative
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Negligence §17.1

a~

276.

The Courts,
distinction, or

whether

simply

using

following

the

the

active

or

passive

rationale used

by the

Alaska Court, have made it clear that the negligence of the
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where
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to third persons.

responsibility
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relief

extended

to

the

injured

party.

In line with this reasoning is a jury finding that
makes the injured or damaged party respond for his own negligence which

was

occurrence but
damages.
with in

not

added

the

actual

solely

to

cause

extend

of

producing

the

injured

the

party's

This appears to be the dilemma the court was faced
the

instant matter
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to
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by
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inasmuch as
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concepts being

did

not
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whether
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appropriately
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clearly

see from the evidence that whatever the causation, the fire
would have caused such nominal or minimal damages had not
the plaintiffs been negligent in their duty to protect themselves and their property.

In addition, as pointed out by

the court in its ruling, there was more than one alleged
negligent act from which the jury would be making a determination.

The Court stated:
But I think it's a legitimate matter and
can be handled by both of you in your arguments in having it considered as one of the
negligent acts, if it is considered to be a
negligent act by the jury that affects some
portion of the damages, possibly.
(Emphasis added.)

(T.340-242).
The Court's ultimate position on the question is
illustrated by the Special Verdict given to the jury for

•

making its determination.

Question.No. 5 of the Special

verdict reads as follows:
If you have answered all of the previous
questions "yes," then and* . .only then are you
to answer this question.
Taking the combined negligence that caused the
damage as 100 percent (100%}, what percentage
of that negligence was attributable to plaintiffs
and what percentage was attributable to the
defendant.
(Emphasis added.)
·
The question clearly illustrated that the negligence
to be compared was that conduct which caused the damage, not
that which created the fire.

The jury properly responded

by apportioning the negligence, or the culpability or fault
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of both parties as the evidence dictated.
The folly in plaintiffs' position comes from the
fact that they have misconstrued the evidence offered as
being only one possible act of negligence on the part of the
plaintiffs.

When the evidence and the record is viewed in a

light most favorable to the respondent, and affording the
respondent the benefit of all inferences which the evidence
fairly supports, it is obvious that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' Motion for a New
Trial or a directed verdict on the grounds of insufficiency
of evidence.

See Pollesche v. Transamerica Insurance Co.,

497 P.2d 236 (Utah 1972).
POINT II.
THE OBVIOUS EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR
THE JURY VERDICT REQUIRES THAT
THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW
BE AFFIRMED.
Plaintiffs claim, in their Second Point on Appeal,
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the plaintiffs a new trial based on his

clai~

of insufficiency of

evidence to justify the jury's verdict.

Once again, the

totality of their argument is that defense counsel only argued
one act of negligence to the jury upon which the jury could
make a finding.
The arguments made in Point I of this Brief are reiterated briefly.

First, defendant's counsel argued more

than one act of negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and
accordingly the second point of their appeal is erroneous.
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secondly, even if only one act is argued before the jury, it
did not bind the jury to a consideration of that one act of
negligence only.

As Judge Ballif stated in his decision on

plaintiff's motion for a Directed Verdict the jury was entitled
to consider the fire extinguisher question, as "one" of the
negligent acts.
This Court's decision in the matter of Smith v.
Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261 (Utah, 1976), clearly states the controlling rule of law:
'It must be kept in mind that the granting or
refusing to grant a new trial is largely a
matter of discretion with the trial judge,
and this court will reverse the trial
court only for an abuse of discretion in
the refusal.
551 P.2d at 1262.
In the case of McLoud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (1977),
•
this Court was also asked to reve~se the lower's Court decision
denying a motion for a:new trial.

In that particular case,

this Court concluded that there was.nothing
in the record to
, ...
support the plaintiff's claim that there was an abuse of
discretion since there was an evidentiary foundation for the
jury verdict.
The court further announced that:
In reviewing denials of motions for
a direct verdict, judgment, N.o.v.,
or in the alternative for a new
trial, this court must view the evidence
in a light most favorable to the party
against whom the motion was made.
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In reviewing a trial court's exercise
of discretion upon a motion for a new
trial, this Court examines the record
to determine whether the evidence to
support the verdict was completely
lacking, or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
unreasonable and unjust.
If there be
an evidentiary basis for the jury's
decision, then denial of the new trial
must be affirmed.·
It is clear from the record and the inferences
which the evidence fairly supports that the questions of
negligence and the comparability of negligence were ones
which were jury questions, and the jury accordingly ruled.
As in the McLoud case, it is clear that there is nothing,
nor is anything proffered by the plaintiff's to substantiate
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COU~T'S DISMISSAL OF
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR LOST PROFITS WAS
PROPER INASMUCH AS THE PLAINTIFFS' HAD
FAILED TO MEET THEIR B~RDEN OF PROOF
ON THAT SUBJECT
The question of damages is a moot subject if this
Court affirms the decision of the court and jury below.
However, defendant feels that at least some discussion is
required relating to appellant's third point.

Point III of

Appellant's Brief urges this Court to find that the trial
court committed error in granting defendant's motion for a
directed verdict as it applied to plaintiffs' claim for loss
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of profits.

once again, a reflection to the record points

out that plaintiffs' failed to meet their burden by establishing those damages to a reasonable certainty necessary for
the court to allow the matter to be considered by the jury.
A general statement of the law is found in the case of Howarth v. ostergaard, 515 P.2d 442 (Utah, 1973), wherein the
Court stated:
The problem as to when and under
what circumstances damages may be
recovered for loss in operating a
business is, as is true in so many
controversial areas of the law,
a coin that has at least two sides
to it.
The basic and general rule
is that the loss of anticipated
prof its of a business venture involve
so many factors of uncertainty that
ordinary prof its to be realized in
the future are too speculative to
base an award of damages thereon.
The other side of the coin is that
damages to a business or enterprise
need only be proved with sufficient
certainty that reasonable minds
might believe from a· preponderance
of evidence that the damages were
actually suffered.
515 P.2d at 445.
It appears that the qualifying factor in finding
loss profits is "sufficient cetainty."
In this case being reviewed, the record is replete with numerous statements by plaintiffs' witnesses which
clearly demonstrate that the plaintiffs' them selves felt no
certainty as to the profits being claimed.
lack

of

certainty

clearly

justified

the

Their apparent
Court's
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'

finding that there was nothing for the jury to rely upon in
making an award of such damages.

Mr. Cantor, plaintiffs'

witness as to the lost prof its claim, when testifying concerning the purported contracts and work the plaintiffs were
to complete for Amoco Minerals, responded to questioning as
follows:

Q: Now, you testify that on October 10,
1979, you received a contract for the
New Mexico Job and that you signed it.
A:

Yes.

Q: Were you aware of the Alzada job prior
to that time.
A:

Yes

Q:

And had you made this verbal bid:

A: At that time I signed the contract I
had two bids with Amoco

Q: And what are your understandings as to
the size of _those jobs.
A:
It was my~understanding the Alzada job
was considerably larger.
Did you make any~·~attempt to contact
Steve Lewis prior to signing that contract
to see if you were being considered for the
other job?

Q:

A:

Yes.

Q:

And what did he say?

A:
I can't remember specifically, I think
I told him that I needed to accept the
Lordsburg job because we had only one truck
available, or that our second truck had not
been completed yet.
We were asked if we would
do the work, and we said yes, and we would
accept the job, but this was before the analysis
was final on the Alzada job.
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Q: Are you telling me that you knew the
Alzada job would be bigger and would bring more
prof it to you and you elected to take the New
Mexico job anyway.
A: Well, we didn't have any certainty at all
that we would have got the bid on the Alzada
job.
So rather than pass up an opportunity to
work on the one month job in New Mexico, we
accepted that work rather than risk loosing both
jobs.

Q: And you are telling me though, that Mr.
Lewis called you four days later and told you that
you were their chosen company for doing the
project?
A:

Yes.

Q:
In that conversation you had with Mr. Lewis
prior to that time, didn't lead you to believe
you were standing in a position to have the job
should the contract be formalized.

A:

Well I felt I could have both jobs • • • •

(T. 224-225.)
Plaintiffs' uncertainty as to their future business
in contracting is explained· hy their practice in bidding for
more jobs than they could possibly handle.

(T. 225.)

In fact, when Mr. Cantor was asked concerning work
that he had bid on for a unit which had not yet been completed,
he made the following admissions:

Q: Mr. Cantor did you just say that you
entered into some contracts for the utilization
of that unit that hadn't yet been completed?

A:
I hadn't entered into a contract formally,
No.
Q:

What you are talking about--

A:

We had accepted the offer of work.
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Your term, "contract" is that the same
term you are using with Mr. Lewis' type of
arrangement?

Q:

(T.

A:

Yes.

Q:

But it's not a contract, right?

A:

No, it wasn't a signed contract.

232.)

The evidence at trial demonstrated that the plaintiffs' practice was to try to line up enough work to keep
their units busy, accordingly, their practice was to talk
with any contractors on the basis of doing the work, when in
fact they never considered their conversations to be in the
nature of an agreement, or contract.

In this particular

case, the two contracts, which were the subject of plaintiffs'
claim for lost profits were identified for the jury and the
court as the July, 1979 contract, and the October 30, 1979
contract.

Mr. Cantor,

during~cross_examination,

indicated

that these never became contracts, nor did he consider his
conversations with the contractor
or the contractor.

b~nding

upon the plaintiffs

The questioning went as follows:

Q: On which day did you sign the contract
for the Amoco job that was scheduled to
start in July, 1979.
A:

.

I didn't sign the contract.

Q: On which day did you sign the contract
that was scheduled to start on October 30,
1979
A:

I did not sign that contract.

Q:

Mr. Cantor, isn't it customarily the
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practice that if you enter into a contract
regarding doing work with these companies
that there would be written contract?
A:

Yes.

Q: And in this case, there were no written
contracts.
A: They were forthcoming.
They ususally
don't deliver the contracts until immediately
before the work is to be done, customarily.

Q: Okay, then until you sign that contract
do you feel you are bound on those contracts.
A:

No.

Q: Do you think Amoco Minerals was bound on
the contract:
A:

No.

(T. pp. 216 and 217.)
The reason that Mr. Cantor had the uncertainty, as
he described in the portion of the transcript extracted, was
that the individual who he was dealing with from Amoco did not
have the authority to bind Amoco, nor did he have the authority
to contract with Acculog.
•.

Mr. Steven Lewis, an employee of Amoco Minerals,
was plaintiffs' principal witness as to loss profits portion
of their damages claim.

In fact it was Mr. Lewis, upon which

they relied for the claimed loss of profits, which would have
resulted from the July, 1979, and the October 30, 1979 contracts
However, on cross-examination, Mr. Lewis admitted that he was
merely an exploration geologist and had no authority to bind
Amoco Minerals to any contract, nor did he have authority to
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make payments on contracts.

That examination was as follows:

Q: Can you sign contracts for Amoco
Minerals.
A:

No.

Q: Could you, between June and December,
1979 sign contracts?
A:
(T.

No.

186.)

Q:
Isn't it also true that before any
contract could be entered into with Amoco
Minerals during this time, that he had to
have the approval of Mr. Squyres?
A:

Yes.

He had to sign the contract.

Q: And isn't it also true that as a matter
of procedure that contracts entered into
with logging outfits were done on a written
basis, a written formal basis?
A:

Contracts were written up, yes.

Q: And at the bottom of those contracts,
the contracting party for Amoco Minerals,
Mr. Squyers would sign that contract?
A:
(T.

Yes.·
......

187.)

Mr. Lewis went on to explain that after the bid
proposals were prepared, one of which was that of the plaintiffs, they were presented to Mr. Squyres and he was the one
that would make the decision as to the placement of the
contract (T. 188.)
No evidence was offered that Mr. Squyres approved
any contract with the plaintiffs inasmuch as no contracts
were ever signed between Amoco Minerals and the plaintiffs
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regarding the two contracts.

Mr. Lewis' entire testimony

was based upon speculation of what Mr. Squyres would or
would have not done, and no direct testimony was offered
upon which the jury could rely in making their decision.
This court has repeatedly indicated that the proof of loss
profits must not be completely speculative, or uncertain.
See, Gould v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
309 P.2d 802 (1957).
Plaintiffs' additional fatal flaw in the presentation of their claim for lost prof its is amplified by their
brief on appeal.

Their entire argument surrounds that par-

ticular evidence, which is demonstrated by the exhibits
attached to the brief, of the costs incurred by Amoco Minerals to a separate contractor on the projects in question.
That of fer of proof merely demonstrated the gross cost of
•

the project to Amoco Minerals, but failed to provide the
jury with some ligitimate means of determining the proper
measure of damages.
struction Co.,

~59

In the case of .-~Flynn v. Schocker ConP.2d 433 (Utah, 1969), the Court stated

that a mere offer of the net profits on other jobs was:
. • • entirely immaterial as the
true rule of damages to which he would
be entitled in case his contract was
wrongfully breached would be the contract
price less the amount of money he would have
necessarily expended in completing
the job."
459 P.2d at 435.
That same measure of damages is applicable in this
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case inasmuch as even if the contracts had been formed, the
plaintiffs' entitlement would have been owing to the difference
between the contract price and their cost of performing said
contracts.

During Mr. Cantor's cross-examination, he was

unable to provide for the jury, or the Court, a figure which
would be representative of his actual profit.

(T. 227.)

The bottom line of this discussion is that the
jury found that the plaintiffs' negligence was greater than
that of the defendants, and, accordingly, they were not
entitled to any relief.

However, the Court's ruling granting

defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to lost profits
was mandated by two important factors:
(1)

The fact that no contracts were ever entered

into, nor was there any real reliance on those agreements by
either the plaintiffs or the contractor.
(2)

The proof

offe~ed

as.lost profits, even if the

contracts had been performed, were not sufficient for the
court to allow the jury to
ages.

speculat~

as to those alleged

dam~

Accordingly, the Court's ruling should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
It has always been the position of this court that

upon review of a jury's verdict and finding, the evidence
must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion for a new trial is made.

In this particular

case, the jury, based upon numerous factors, concluded that
the negligence of the plaintiffs was greater than that of
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the defendant.

To disrupt

tha~

particular finding in the

face of clearly sufficient evidence on the question of plaintiffs' comparative negligence would be unfair and unsupportable.

To intrude upon that province of the jury would under-

mine participants in the judicial systems reliance upon the
jury system, and the respect that it is entitled to in the
dispute-settling process.

Accordingly, defendant urges the

Court to affirm the jury's verdict and the court's findings,
including that of its verdict as to the lost profits question.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2._f

day of

September, 1982.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT was mailed, first-class,
postage prepaid on this c;:2(
Paul

w.

day of September, 1982 to

Mortensen, 131 East 100 South, P.O. Box 339, Moab,

Utah 84532; Harry E. Snow, 82 North Main, P.O. Box 520, Moab,
Utah 84532, Attorneys for Appellant.
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